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RESURRECTING DEFERENCE TO THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: MARK CUBAN AND TRADING ON 
INSIDE INFORMATION 
Steven J. Cleveland

 
Abstract 
By applying the Supreme Court‘s administrative law jurisprudence 
to the examination of the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)—a rule recently 
adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)—
this Article fills a significant gap in the existing literature. To date, 
commentators have argued against the rule‘s validity by applying the 
Supreme Court‘s securities law jurisprudence without considering the 
role of administrative law—despite the Court‘s comments that the 
pertinent statute is ambiguous, despite express delegation of rulemaking 
authority by Congress to the Commission, and despite developments in 
administrative law subsequent to the Court‘s relevant securities law 
decisions. By not considering the role of administrative law, 
commentators have approached the rule with undue skepticism. 
Administrative law principles dictate judicial deference to the 
Commission‘s rule. The Commission once commanded deference from 
courts. The time has come to resurrect that deference.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Mark Cuban earned billions during the Internet boom of the late 
1990s; in the year 2000, he used some of those earnings to purchase a 
majority interest in the Dallas Mavericks, a member of the National 
Basketball Association (NBA).
1
 Not content to watch his team from a 
luxury box high above the court, Cuban regularly sits courtside and, like 
other fans, enthusiastically comments on the action. Perhaps his 
enthusiasm has gotten the better of him; he has repeatedly and publicly 
criticized NBA referees and league officials. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the NBA has fined Cuban multiple times for flouting its authority.
2
 
Cuban‘s run-ins with authority, however, have not been limited to the 
sporting realm. 
In 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) 
accused Cuban of violating federal securities laws. According to the 
allegations of the Commission, the Chief Executive Officer of 
Mamma.com Inc. (MCI) contacted Cuban—who owned approximately 
6% of the outstanding shares of MCI—and offered to share material, 
nonpublic information if Cuban agreed to maintain its confidentiality.
3
 
Cuban allegedly accepted those terms; after learning the information, 
however, he promptly sold his entire stake in the company.
4
 Cuban sold 
his stock for approximately $13.30 per share on June 28 and 29, 2004—
before the information became known publicly.
5
 After the markets 
closed on June 29, 2004, MCI publicly disclosed the information; 
trading in the company‘s stock opened the following day at $11.89 per 
share, and ultimately closed that day at $11.99 per share.
6
 By trading in 
advance of the disclosure of that material, nonpublic information, 
Cuban avoided the loss of more than $750,000.
7
 The Commission 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Mike Wise, Despite Expectation, Magic Is Doing Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, 
at 85. 
 2. See Timeline of Mark Cuban Fines, ESPN (June 20, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/ 
espn/wire?section=nba&id=2492950.  
 3. See Complaint at 3–5, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 08 
Civ. 2050-D); id. at 5–6 (discussing the share price and amount of loss avoided). The 
information concerned a private investment in public equity (PIPE) offering. See id. at 3. 
Because a company is more likely to issue stock when its shares are overvalued, the market may 
respond negatively to news of an upcoming issuance. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm‘n, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Manager Hilary Shane with Insider Trading (May 18, 
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-76.htm (alleging insider trading when 
insider shorted stock prior to public disclosure of PIPE offering); see, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 136 (6th ed. 2009) (noting the experience of 
Boston Chicken, Inc.).  
 4. Complaint, supra note 3, at 5. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 5–6.  
 7. Id. at 6. 
2
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accused Cuban of committing securities fraud by engaging in illegal 
insider trading.
8
 
The district court dismissed the Commission‘s complaint, reasoning 
that even if Cuban agreed to maintain the company‘s confidences, he 
did not agree to forgo any securities trade based on the confidential 
information.
9
 Trading, however, discloses information, even if it does so 
indirectly and imprecisely.
10
 The Fifth Circuit determined that the 
allegations provided a plausible basis to conclude that Cuban 
understood that he was not to trade and that his agreement with the 
company was more than a simple confidentiality agreement.
11
 
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to identify the 
contours of a relationship of ―trust and confidence,‖ or to speak to the 
validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), promulgated under § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).
12
  
Some of the leading business law scholars (BLS)—Professors 
Stephen Bainbridge, Alan Bromberg, Allen Ferrell, M. Todd 
Henderson, and Jonathan R. Macey—believe that, based upon Supreme 
Court precedent, illegal insider trading requires the breach of a fiduciary 
duty (or a similar duty of trust and confidence) when silence serves as 
the basis for the fraud.
13
 Applying this rationale to the Cuban case, they 
conclude that Cuban could not have engaged in illegal insider trading, 
because a confidentiality agreement alone does not suffice to establish a 
fiduciary (or similar) relationship.
14
 From their perspective, the 
Commission exceeded its authority by promulgating a rule imposing 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id. at 6–8.  
 9. See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725–26, 731 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
 10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and 
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 336; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 631 (1984) (noting that 
an insider‘s trade has communicative value, but is not an efficient means of communication); 
Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider 
Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 56–57 (1984) (―[A duty may be] breached as much by 
wrongful disclosure as by wrongful trading.‖). In Cuban, the district court apparently failed to 
appreciate the communicative value of the defendant‘s trades. See 634 F. Supp. 2d at 725–26. 
Within a thirty-six-hour period, Cuban went from being the company‘s largest shareholder (with 
6% of its shares) to owning zero shares of the company. Id. at 718. But cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) 
(2006) (requiring disclosure of trades by 10% owners of specified issuers‘ equity securities). 
 11. See SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 557–58 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 12. Id. at 558 & n.40. 
 13. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellee at 10–16, 
SEC v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-10996) [hereinafter BLS‘ Appellate Brief]; 
Amended Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss at 2–3, SEC v. 
Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 08 Civ. 2050-D) [hereinafter BLS‘ Trial 
Brief]. 
 14. See BLS‘ Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 21–22; BLS‘ Trial Brief, supra note 13, at 
2–3. 
3
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insider-trading liability based upon the breach of a confidentiality 
agreement.
15
  
This Article argues that the Commission did not exceed its 
authority.
16
 Part I introduces background on the Commission‘s 
regulation of insider trading. Part II then challenges the underlying 
premise of the BLS that silence cannot be deceptive absent the breach 
of a fiduciary (or similar) duty. The BLS premise their argument on 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the statute in cases involving 
insider trading, but they ignore the Court‘s precedent concerning 
administrative law. This Article fills a gap in the literature by 
considering the role of administrative law when addressing the validity 
of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). 
Contrary to the BLS‘ premise, the Supreme Court defines the scope 
of insider-trading liability only until the Commission offers an 
alternative, reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguity.
17
 In 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See BLS‘ Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 21–27; BLS‘ Trial Brief, supra note 13, at 
2–3. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A 
Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 95 (1998) (―There is little justification for 
making the breach of an agency or fiduciary duty to an employer, client, or similar beneficiary a 
federal, rather than a state law, claim unless a national economic interest is implicated.‖). 
 16. To be clear, this Article addresses whether the Commission possesses the power to 
promulgate Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), not whether the Commission should have promulgated the rule. 
Others have addressed whether the Commission should regulate insider trading. See HENRY G. 
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 163–67 (1966) (opposing federal 
regulation); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 282–89 (1982) 
(favoring federal regulation); Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider 
Trading on Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881 (2010) (favoring federal 
regulation of outsider trading). 
 17. See infra Subsection II.B.1. This Article focuses on civil enforcement actions by the 
Commission, not private causes of actions implied by the courts. Private causes of action may 
subject defendants to abuse, see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), and may be subject to limitations inapplicable to civil 
enforcement actions by the Commission. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 n.6 
(1979) (distinguishing between governmental enforcement actions and potentially frivolous 
private litigation). Greater specificity might be required for purposes of criminal enforcement. 
See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (―[I]t is appropriate to apply the rule of 
lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute‘s coverage.‖); United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (―Useful as such an elastic and expedient 
definition of confidential relations, i.e., relations of trust and confidence, may be in the civil 
context, it has no place in the criminal law.‖); United States v. Cassese, 273 F. Supp. 2d 481, 
486 n.1, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting defendant‘s motion to dismiss criminal charges, noting 
that the Commission refused to bring civil enforcement action); Stephen Joyce, Lawyers Say 
High Court Honest Services Case Will Hamper Prosecution of Corporate Fraud, 42 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1824 (Sept. 27, 2010) (criticizing ―controversial prosecutions in which the 
line between civil and criminal conduct was blurred‖ and in which ―wrongdoing by 
breaching . . . fiduciary duties . . . might [be] . . . transformed into federal criminal fraud 
cases‖); Yin Wilczek, Judge, Attorneys Debate Vagueness of Standard for Securities Fraud 
Liability, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1541 (Aug 16, 2010) (discussing dismissal with 
4
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National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services, the Supreme Court held that a court‘s interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute does not prevent an administering agency from 
interpreting the statute differently, and the agency‘s interpretation, so 
long as it is reasonable, displaces that of the court.
18
 So while the BLS 
may be correct that, when interpreting a statutory ambiguity, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized the violation of a fiduciary (or similar) 
duty before silence could constitute deception under § 10(b),
19
 the 
Supreme Court‘s emphasis does not prohibit the Commission from 
interpreting that ambiguity differently. Moreover, in § 10(b), Congress 
expressly delegated rulemaking authority to the Commission. 
Consequently, courts should defer to the agency‘s reasonable 
interpretation regarding the party deceived, which interpretation the 
Commission forged in Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). In light of the text of § 10(b), 
its ambiguity regarding deception, and the Supreme Court‘s 
administrative law jurisprudence, courts should defer to the reasonable 
policy interpretations made by the Commission that result from notice-
and-comment rulemaking. The Commission once commanded 
deference from the Court.
20
 The time has come for resurrecting that 
deference. 
                                                                                                                     
prejudice of criminal charges, but dismissal without prejudice of Commission‘s civil 
enforcement action).  
 18. See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomm. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84 
(2005) (―Since Chevron teaches that a court‘s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous 
statute an agency is charged with administering is not authoritative, the agency‘s decision to 
construe that statute differently from a court does not say that the court‘s holding was legally 
wrong. Instead, the agency may, consistent with the court‘s holding, choose a different 
construction, since the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) 
of such statutes.‖). 
 19. See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 20. Compare Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (―It is a 
commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative agency‘s consistent, longstanding 
interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight.‖), United 
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 n.25 (1975) (―Traditionally the views of an 
agency charged with administering the governing statute would be entitled to considerable 
weight.‖), and SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1946) (―The Commission has 
followed the same definition in its own administrative proceedings.‖), with Lampf v. Gilbertson, 
501 U.S. 350, 354–55 (1991) (rejecting, without any reference to Chevron, the Commission‘s 
proposed limitations period for a private action under § 10(b)), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 197–99 (1976) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore, the Commission‘s 
interpretation regarding the defendant‘s mental state), and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738–39, 746 n.10 (1975) (rejecting, without any reference to Skidmore, 
the Commission‘s interpretation regarding the plaintiff‘s standing). Though the Court largely 
accepted the Solicitor General‘s position in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008), the Commission articulated a contrary position in the lower 
courts; the Solicitor General prohibited the Commission from presenting that contrary position 
to the Court. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Limits Lawsuits by Shareholders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at C1 (―The Securities and Exchange Commission supported the 
5
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I.  THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING GENERALLY 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act, which 
created the Commission to administer the federal securities laws and 
included § 10(b).
21
 Section 10(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . . [t]o use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.
22
 
Though it prohibited deceptive devices and contrivances,
23
 Congress did 
not define any of those terms and it provided no specificity regarding 
the identification of the deceived party. By prohibiting deception ―in 
connection with‖ the purchase or sale of a security, Congress intended 
to prohibit deception beyond that which occurs ―in‖ or ―during‖ a 
purchase or sale of securities.
24
 That is, the statute prohibits more than a 
purchaser‘s deception of a seller and a seller‘s deception of a 
purchaser.
25
 Consequently, the ―in connection with‖ language certainly 
broadens the pool of persons who may have been deceived contrary to 
the statute, but Congress left ambiguous whose deception can constitute 
a violation. 
In § 10(b), Congress prohibited nothing except that which 
contravenes rules that the Commission may promulgate. Thereby, 
Congress expressly delegated rulemaking authority to the Commission. 
Congress intentionally left a gap for the agency to fill.
26
 Moreover, the 
                                                                                                                     
plaintiffs . . . . [T]he S.E.C. was denied authority to file a brief. Justice Kennedy‘s opinion on 
Tuesday closely tracked the brief that Solicitor General Paul D. Clement eventually filed.‖). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). 
 22. Id. § 78j(b). 
 23. ―Manipulative‖ is a term of art that has been defined narrowly. See Santa Fe Indus., 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). 
 24. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 25. See id. at 658 (―The misappropriation theory comports with § 10(b)‘s language, which 
requires deception ‗in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,‘ not deception of an 
identifiable purchaser or seller.‖); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) 
(―[T]he language of Rule 10b-5 . . . contains no specific requirement that fraud be perpetrated 
upon the seller or buyer of securities.‖). 
 26. See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007). 
[T]he ultimate question is whether Congress would have intended, and 
expected, courts to treat an agency‘s rule, regulation, application of a statute, or 
other agency action as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of ‗gap-
filling‘ authority. Where an agency rule sets forth important . . . duties, where 
the agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses full 
6
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congressional language—―as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors‖—makes plain the general 
policy making authority that Congress delegated to the Commission. 
An episode of insider trading reportedly prompted the Commission 
to exercise the authority granted by Congress under § 10(b) and to 
promulgate Rule 10b-5, which generally prohibits securities fraud. 
During the 1940s, a business executive falsely presented to his investors 
a bleak future for the company.
27
 The false news prompted investors to 
sell their shares in the company, and the price of the company‘s 
securities consequently fell. Knowing that the company actually had a 
rosy future, the business executive then purchased shares of the 
company at a depressed price, which rebounded when the true state of 
affairs came to light. Because neither the federal statutes nor existing 
Commission rules clearly prohibited fraud in the purchase of shares (as 
opposed to fraud in the sale of shares), and because such behavior may 
be ―contrary to the public interest‖ and may evidence a need for 
investor protection, the Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5.
28
 
                                                                                                                     
notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule, where the resulting rule 
falls within the statutory grant of authority, and where the rule itself is 
reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to defer to 
the agency‘s determination. 
Id. at 173–174. 
 27. For the factual background of this episode, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185, 212 n.32 (1976). 
 28. As of this writing, Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). Though § 10(b) as originally enacted may not have been intended 
to prohibit insider trading generally, see Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 429–30 (1990), subsequent congressional 
enactments support a view of § 10(b) that encompasses a prohibition of insider trading. See 
generally Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 
§ 2, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, §§ 1–2, 
98 Stat. 1264 (1984). 
7
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Although each references ―any person,‖ neither § 10(b) nor Rule 
10b-5 specifically references insiders or insider trading.
29
 Section 10(b) 
speaks of ―deceptive devices and contrivances.‖ Rule 10b-5 speaks of 
―fraud, deceit, and materially misleading misstatements or omissions.‖ 
Since enacting § 10(b), Congress has spoken of the evils of insider 
trading, but it has consciously avoided attempts to define insider 
trading.
30
 Similarly, the Commission generally has eschewed defining 
insider trading for fear of providing a blueprint for mischief.
31
 The 
Commission generally has utilized enforcement actions to establish the 
parameters of prohibited conduct on a case-by-case basis.
32
 
Consequently, the Commission, the courts, and the parties struggle to 
identify the parameters of legal conduct.
33
 
Affirmative misrepresentations yield relatively straightforward 
analysis.
34
 Misleading omissions that give rise to liability, however, 
have proved perplexing. If an outsider of the company works diligently 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (requiring disgorgement of short-swing trading profits 
by certain directors, officers, and large shareholders). 
 30. See H.R. REP. No. 100-910 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6048 
(―While cognizant of the importance of providing clear guidelines for behavior [involving 
insider trading] which may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties, the Committee 
nevertheless declined to include a statutory definition in this bill . . . .‖); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355 
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2287 (―[E]vidence seems to show that any effort 
to define insider trading would result in, at best, a slightly less generalized rule than 10b-5 and, 
at worst, a rule that leaves gaping holes . . . .‖). 
 31. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 127 (―[T]he SEC is a prosecutorial agency that has long 
articulated the view that detailed regulations will be a blueprint for fraud and therefore it is 
better to rely upon general antifraud concepts to police the securities markets.‖). 
 32. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA 106 (1982) (suggesting that the SEC 
looks and thinks like a legal adversary of the securities industry); Karmel, supra note 15, at 126 
(―[T]he SEC has developed its insider trading policies through ad hoc enforcement cases . . . .‖). 
 33. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices about Investor 
Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1622 (2006) (―While its 
motivations connect closely to historic values, insider trading doctrine itself is messy, 
incoherent, and result-oriented . . . .‖). As is the case with other complicated areas of law, the 
analytical approach applicable to one area of regulated conduct may not apply with full force to 
a different area of that regulated conduct. See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
1577, 1580 (2010) (rejecting the argument that courts should employ a balancing test to 
determine the applicability of First Amendment protection to animal cruelty videos, despite 
precedent calling for a balancing test to determine the applicability of First Amendment 
protection to other categories of speech). 
 34. For example, if Cuban intended to trade on the information at the time that he entered 
into the confidentiality agreement, then he would have affirmatively misrepresented his intent to 
maintain the information‘s confidentiality. Cf. SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 
2009) (distinguishing between silence and affirmative misrepresentation to gain access to 
information); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 1991) (describing a former employee 
who, despite his termination, misrepresented his ongoing employment with the source to 
continue access to material, nonpublic information). 
8
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and (legally) unearths information that enables her to trade profitably in 
the company‘s securities, then she should retain the profits from the 
trade as the fruits of her labor. Requiring her to disclose the information 
to others before allowing her to trade would decrease or eliminate her 
profit and discourage her diligent quest for valuable information. Such 
diligence, however, should be encouraged, not discouraged.
35
 Though it 
may have been advocated in individual cases, neither the Commission 
nor the Supreme Court has supported the parity of information rationale, 
which would require one who discovers information either to abstain 
from trading or disclose the information to others before trading.
36
 
Rejecting the parity of information rationale, however, does nothing 
to provide a coherent rationale for imposing liability stemming from 
one‘s silence. Typically, silence is not troubling in a transaction. Caveat 
emptor frequently provides the rule of thumb. Caveat emptor applies 
more easily when tangible property, as opposed to stock, changes hands. 
Further complicating the analysis, stock is routinely traded 
impersonally. Without personal interaction, silence is what one expects 
to hear from the counterparty, so silence generally does not mislead. 
Given Congress‘s and the Commission‘s prior unwillingness to 
provide the requisite guidance, courts have filled the void. As to 
whether silence may constitute the deception required by § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, the judiciary has premised insider-trading liability on a 
breach of fiduciary duty.
37
 The Supreme Court described the principal 
theories of liability for such insider trading to include the following: (1) 
when an insider breaches a fiduciary duty by trading on the basis of 
material, nonpublic information;
38
 (2) when an insider, in breach of a 
fiduciary duty, tips a third party who knows or should know of the 
breach and who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic information;
39
 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 131–45 (1966) 
(discussing the entrepreneur‘s compensation). 
 36. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 89 (―[T]he parity of information theory has not been 
accepted by the Supreme Court or the SEC itself.‖).  
 37. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice 
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1590 (1999). Aside from 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the federal government otherwise relegates insider trading. See, 
e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (requiring disgorgement of short-swing profits obtained by 
certain directors and officers). 
 38. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980); id. at 230 (―Application 
of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation 
to place the shareholder‘s welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through 
fraudulent use of material, nonpublic information.‖). The prohibition extends to temporary 
insiders. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (―Under certain circumstances, such 
as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or 
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the 
shareholders.‖). 
 39. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (―[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
9
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and (3) when an outsider trades on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source 
of that information.
40
  
Long advocated by the Commission, the third theory—the 
misappropriation theory—was most recently accepted by the Supreme 
Court, and it is the misappropriation theory that gave rise to Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1), the rule at issue in the case against Mark Cuban. But first, a few 
words on the Supreme Court‘s decision to embrace the misappropriation 
theory, according to which the deceived party is not the counterparty to 
the trade. 
In United States v. O’Hagan, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) 
formed a secret plan to acquire the Pillsbury Company.
41
 Such an 
acquisition, on a per-share basis, would not occur at the price listed on a 
stock exchange. An exchange lists the price for one share, a relatively 
inconsequential amount. Grant Met did not want to purchase a relatively 
inconsequential amount; it wanted to buy control of Pillsbury. To 
acquire control, one must pay a premium above the price listed on an 
exchange.
42
 Grand Met maintained the secrecy of its plan, because if 
news of its plan leaked to the public, then the price for Pillsbury would 
have risen and jeopardized the success of the planned acquisition.
43
  
To facilitate its plan, Grand Met retained counsel in Minnesota, 
where Pillsbury was headquartered.
44
 James Herman O‘Hagan—who 
was an attorney at the Minnesota law firm, but was not personally 
representing Grand Met—learned of the planned acquisition from an 
attorney at his law firm who was representing Grand Met.
45
 O‘Hagan 
then acquired securities issued by Pillsbury, knowing that their value 
would increase when Grand Met eventually announced its plan to the 
                                                                                                                     
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has 
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.‖). 
 40. United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997) (―Is a person who trades in 
securities for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a 
fiduciary duty to the source of the information, guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5? . . . 
[Y]es . . . .‖). 
 41. For the factual background of the case, see O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48.  
 42. See Paramount Commc‘ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994) 
(―The acquisition of majority status and the consequent privilege of exerting the powers of 
majority ownership come at a price. That price is usually a control premium which recognizes 
not only the value of a control block of shares, but also compensates the minority stockholders 
for their resulting loss of voting power.‖); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATIONS 1137 (6th ed. 2004) (―Of course, stock market value represented the value of 
minority shares because controlling shares do not trade.‖). 
 43. See Macey, supra note 10, at 25. 
 44. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647. 
 45. Id. at 647, 649 n.1. 
10
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public.
46
 Following Grand Met‘s public announcement, O‘Hagan 
profited on the sales of his Pillsbury securities.
47
 O‘Hagan appealed 
criminal convictions on numerous counts of violating, among other 
federal securities laws and regulations, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
48
 
Then-existing Supreme Court precedent interpreting § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 may not have sufficed to discipline O‘Hagan.49 O‘Hagan 
was not a fiduciary or insider of Pillsbury, in whose securities he 
traded.
50
 Shareholders of Pillsbury had not placed their trust in him. No 
one at Pillsbury, in whose securities O‘Hagan traded, had tipped him 
about the acquisition. Pillsbury—like the market at large—was ignorant 
of Grand Met‘s secret plan at the time of O‘Hagan‘s trades.  
The Commission had long pursued defendants under a theory of 
misappropriation, which had divided the circuit courts of appeals.
51
 
Twice before, the Supreme Court had been presented with the question 
whether liability under § 10(b) could be based upon the 
misappropriation theory, but in one case, the theory had not been 
presented to the jury, and in the other case, the Court divided evenly on 
the issue.
52
 Given a third opportunity, the Court upheld the validity of 
the misappropriation theory. ―[T]he misappropriation theory outlaws 
trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate ‗outsider‘ 
in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the 
information.‖53 The statutorily required deception is perpetrated on the 
source of the confidential information to whom the fiduciary ―feign[ed] 
fidelity.‖54 
―Although the Court . . . approved the misappropriation theory 
in . . . O’Hagan, it did not develop a broad doctrine or policy rationale 
[to] . . . assist the lower courts in distinguishing between lawful and 
unlawful outsider trading.‖55 Though it may be advisable for the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 647. 
 47. Id. at 648.  
 48. Id. at 648–49.  
 49. See id. at 653 n.5. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Compare United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) 
(upholding the validity of the misappropriation theory), SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (same), and SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), with United 
States v. O‘Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 613–14 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the validity of the 
misappropriation theory), and United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943-59 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(same). 
 52. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235–36 (1980); Carpenter v. United 
States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983) (noting that the 
defendant did not misappropriate the information used by others to trade profitably).  
 53. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
 54. Id. at 655; see id. at 652 (―[A] fiduciary‘s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal‘s 
information . . . defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.‖). 
 55. Karmel, supra note 15, at 84. 
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to issue narrow rulings,
56
 the Commission has been criticized for 
regulating on a case-by-case basis, instead of promulgating broad rules 
that facilitate transaction planning and dispute resolution. Following the 
Court‘s decision in United States v. O’Hagan, the Commission 
promulgated a new rule.
57
 Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) provides a nonexclusive 
basis for liability under the misappropriation theory; the requisite duty 
exists ―[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in 
confidence.‖58  
II.  THE COMMISSION‘S REGULATION OF SILENCE AS DECEPTION 
According to the BLS, Supreme Court precedent requires the breach 
of a fiduciary (or similar) duty before silence can be deceptive in a 
securities trade. And, the argument continues, because a simple 
confidentiality agreement alone does not give rise to a fiduciary (or 
similar) relationship, the Commission exceeded its authority in 
                                                                                                                     
 56. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1996).  
 57. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51734 (Aug. 24, 
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)) (―[T]he rule will provide greater clarity and 
certainty to the law . . . .‖). 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2012). Rule 10b5-2(a) provides that ―[t]his section 
shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the Act . . . and [Rule 10b-5] thereunder that is 
based on the purchase or sale of securities on the basis of, or the communication of, material 
nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.‖ Id. 
§ 240.10b5-2(a).  
Some scholars note the distinction between the Supreme Court‘s language (duty of trust 
and confidence) and the language of the Commission‘s rule (duty of trust or confidence). See 
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 1315, 1360 (2009). In this instance, emphasis on the and/or distinction may be misplaced. 
First, Congress, not the Supreme Court, delineates the reach of § 10(b), see U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§§ 7, 8, and the statute speaks of deception. The Supreme Court‘s ―and‖ (rather than the 
Commission‘s ―or‖) is not critical to deception. See W. Page Keeton, Fraud—Concealment and 
Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12 (1936) (noting that silence can be deceptive where 
―one . . . of the parties expressly reposes a trust or confidence in the other‖) (emphasis added). 
Second, ―confidence‖ and ―trust‖ overlap. Webster‘s Dictionary defines ―confidence‖ as ―a 
relation of trust.‖ WEBSTER‘S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 275 (1983) (definition 3a). 
―Trust‖ is defined as ―one in which confidence is placed.‖ Id. at 1268 (definition 1b). Despite 
the overlap of their meaning, one might be inclined to interpret the words ―trust‖ and 
―confidence‖ to mean different things; otherwise, there is no reason to use two words when one 
would do. The Supreme Court, however, used the singular—duty of trust and confidence—as 
opposed to the plural—duties of trust and confidence, suggesting that the Court employed 
overlapping rhetoric, never intending emphasis on any possible distinction between ―trust‖ and 
―confidence.‖ But see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (referencing the ―duties of 
care and loyalty‖ to indicate separate and distinct concepts). Finally, the Supreme Court has 
criticized hypertechnical interpretations of the Exchange Act, see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 
813, 819 (2002) (―construed, not technically and restrictively, but flexibly . . . .‖) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), so one need not hypertechnically construe rhetorical dicta included in 
its opinions interpreting the Exchange Act.  
12
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promulgating Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). The BLS, however, misperceive 
congressional allocation of interpretive authority between the courts and 
the Commission. Contrary to the position espoused in the writings of 
the BLS, the Commission, in promulgating Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), acted 
consistent with § 10(b) and with the Supreme Court‘s administrative 
law and securities law precedent. 
Congress unquestionably wields the power to legislate,
59
 but it 
inevitably enacts ambiguous statutes.
60
 Consequently, the resolution of 
statutory ambiguity is a pervasive problem. In the absence of 
congressional clarification, who should resolve the ambiguity—a court, 
or the agency charged by Congress to administer the ambiguous statute? 
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
61
 
the Supreme Court formalized its practice of according weight to the 
position articulated by an administering agency: If Congress did not 
squarely address the issue and if the administering agency‘s 
interpretation of the statutory ambiguity is reasonable, then a court 
should defer to the agency‘s interpretation, even if the court might have 
interpreted the ambiguity differently.
62
 
Consequently, analysis under Chevron generally involves a two-step 
inquiry. Step One involves the determination of whether the statute is 
ambiguous. Step Two involves the determination of whether the 
agency‘s interpretation is reasonable. Because the Court has not always 
applied Chevron analysis, despite its apparent applicability, some 
conclude that the Court undertakes a preliminary determination before 
applying Chevron‘s two steps, with the preliminary determination 
termed ―Step Zero.‖63 So, for example, some matters might be deemed 
too significant for Congress to have delegated their resolution to an 
agency, such as the regulation of physician-assisted suicide.
64
 Congress, 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7, 8. 
 60. See generally Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (interpreting the 
phrase ―carries a firearm‖); id. at 144 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (―And in the television series 
‗M*A*S*H,‘ Hawkeye Pierce (played by Alan Alda) presciently proclaims: ‗I will not carry a 
gun. . . . I‘ll carry your books, I‘ll carry a torch, I‘ll carry a tune, I‘ll carry on, carry over, carry 
forward, Cary Grant, cash and carry, carry me back to Old Virginia, I‘ll even hari-kari if you 
show me how, but I will not carry a gun!‘‖) (citation omitted). 
 61. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 62. See id. at 842–44; Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) 
(―[The Court must] accept . . . those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the 
principles of construction courts normally employ.‖) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 63. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873 
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (discussing 
considerations that might arise prior to Chevron Step One). Congress, however, delegated to the 
Commission rulemaking authority in § 10(b), empowering the Commission to identify those 
deceptive practices that will be prohibited. 
 64. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267–68 (2006) (―The importance of the issue 
13
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however, delegated significant authority to the Commission, including 
interpretative authority regarding § 10(b). 
A.  Congressional Delegation to the Commission 
A statutory ambiguity leaves room for an agency to fill the gap, but 
Congress must have charged the agency with administering the 
ambiguous statute.
65
 Congress created the Commission to administer the 
Exchange Act.
66
 Congress granted the Commission rulemaking 
authority generally and, in particular, with respect to § 10(b).
67
 
Congress empowered the Commission to investigate statutory and rules 
violations.
68
 Congress empowered the Commission to conduct 
administrative cease-and-desist proceedings for present, past, or future 
statutory and rules violations,
69
 as well as general administrative 
proceedings.
70
 In addition to administrative proceedings, the 
Commission may pursue injunctions, fines, and penalties in federal 
court.
71
 In light of these far-ranging delegated powers, and in particular 
                                                                                                                     
of physician-assisted suicide, which has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate 
across the country, makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.‖) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass‘ns, 531 
U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (―Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide 
elephants in mouseholes.‖); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 
(2000) (―[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of 
such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.‖). 
 65. Compare SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (―[The SEC‘s] interpretation 
of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if 
it is reasonable, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30, and n. 12 (2001).‖), 
with Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008) 
(refusing to defer to the Commission‘s position presented in a private cause of action where the 
Commission was not administering the statute). 
 66. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 
U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (―[Congress] envisioned that the SEC would enforce the statutory 
prohibition [of Section 10(b)] through administrative and injunctive actions.‖). 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (―It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.‖); id. § 78w(a)(1) (―The Commission . . . shall . . . have power to make 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of 
this chapter for which [it is] responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in [it] by 
this chapter . . . .‖). 
 68. See id. §§ 78u(a), (c). 
 69. See id. § 78u-3. 
 70. See id. §§ 78o(c)(4), 78u-2; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) (expanding coverage to all 
persons, not just those associated with registered entities). 
 71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u-1, 78aa (2006). 
14
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the rulemaking authority granted under § 10(b), Congress intended the 
Commission to fill statutory gaps and, in particular, gaps in § 10(b).
72
  
Concluding that the Commission has the authority to fill a statutory 
gap does not end the inquiry. Deference follows agency positions that 
have the force of law. A position has the force of law if it results from 
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
73
 The Court 
previously has deferred to the Commission‘s interpretation of an 
ambiguity of § 10(b) in the context of a formal adjudication.
74
 Rule 
                                                                                                                     
 72. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–03 (1975) (stating that § 10(b) 
was intended as a ―catch-all‖ and that the ―Commission should have the authority to deal with 
new manipulative devices‖) (quoting Thomas G. Corcoran, who is credited as a coauthor of 
federal securities regulation of the 1930s, see ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON 
JOHNSON: THE PATH TO POWER 322, 326 (1982)); see also COX, supra note 3 (―[T]he Exchange 
Act is in large part a laundry list of problems for which Congress articulated neither the means 
nor the end objective. Instead, Congress . . . created the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and delegated to it the task of grappling with the problem areas.‖); cf. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243, 259–60 (2006) (according less deference to an agency position when Congress 
delegated only limited powers to be exercised in limited ways). The statutory ambiguities that 
gave rise to Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) fall within the Commission‘s domain, but there may be certain 
ambiguities regarding § 10(b) that Congress intended the courts—not the Commission—to 
resolve. For example, Congress may have intended the courts—not the Commission—to 
determine the scope of private causes of action. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 746 n.10 (1975); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 579 (2009) 
(―Congress likely intended courts to interpret the PSLRA or at least knew that they would. The 
explanation is straightforward: courts have been the primary interpreters of securities law in the 
context of private class actions.‖). When private parties litigate, the Commission may play a 
diminished role. Given the potential abuse posed by private plaintiffs, the scope of private 
causes of action might be a matter deemed too significant for Congress to have delegated its 
resolution to an agency, such that Chevron deference may not be appropriate. See Gonzales, 546 
U.S. at 267 (―The importance of the issue . . . , which has been the subject of an earnest and 
profound debate across the country, makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the 
more suspect.‖) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) (―[W]e are confident that Congress could 
not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an 
agency in so cryptic a fashion.‖). However, misappropriation principally arises in public 
enforcement actions, rather than private lawsuits, see Matthew A. Aufman, Note, Civil Liability 
under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 for Misappropriators of Nonpublic Information: An Argument 
for Consistency, 40 B.C. L. REV. 829, 849 (1999) (―Few lawsuits have been brought to date 
under the misappropriation theory of Rule 10b-5 . . . .‖), because the deceived source may have 
neither purchased nor sold securities, see Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 738–39, and because of 
the difficulty faced by third-party traders in establishing causation and reliance. See Stoneridge, 
552 U.S. at 152–53. 
 73. Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) 
(―[Congressionally] delegated authority . . . carrying the force of law . . . may be shown . . . by 
an agency‘s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . .‖), with 
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (―Interpretations such as those 
in . . . policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the 
force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.‖). 
 74. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (―[The SEC‘s] interpretation of 
15
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10b5-2(b)(1) resulted from formal notice-and-comment rulemaking,
75
 
and should command judicial deference so long as the statute is 
ambiguous and the Commission‘s rule reasonably resolves the 
ambiguity. 
B.  Statutory Ambiguity 
A court owes no deference to an administrative agency regarding an 
issue on which the statute is unambiguous.
76
 The Exchange Act, 
however, is ambiguous regarding the points for which the Commission 
promulgated Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). In § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 
Congress prohibited deception in connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security. Congress provided no guidance regarding what parties 
might be deceived.
77
 Moreover, Congress did not prohibit deception 
―in‖ or ―during‖ the purchase or sale of a security; it prohibited 
deception ―in connection with‖ the purchase or sale of a security. The 
language ―in connection with‖ makes it plain that Congress intended to 
protect parties beyond a deceived seller or a deceived purchaser. 
Congress, however, gave no additional guidance. Consequently, the 
Commission could promulgate a rule regarding the deception of a 
source of confidential nonpublic information.
78
  
To the extent that one finds legislative history persuasive,
79
 
Congress has contemplated imposing liability under the securities laws 
for misappropriating information in violation of contractual 
                                                                                                                     
the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if it 
is reasonable, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30, and n. 12 (2001).‖). 
 75. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51738 (Aug. 24, 
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)) (adopting, among other rules, Rule 10b5-2), 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590, 72610 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing, among other rules, Rule 10b5-2). See generally 
Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439, 456 (2010) 
(―[D]ecisions . . . [should] . . . be made publicly and explicitly through rule-making. Simply 
placing the fiduciary label on the securities industry and leaving the rest to ad hoc decisions will 
produce a platform that is neither stable nor functional.‖). 
 76. See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomm. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 
(2005) (―Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the 
agency‘s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a 
conflicting agency construction.‖). 
 77. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 660 (1997) (noting that the statute does 
not refer to ―identifiable purchasers or sellers of securities‖). 
 78. See generally In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961) (―The absence of 
a remedy by the private litigant because of lack of privity does not absolve an insider from 
responsibility for fraudulent conduct.‖); Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High about Rule 
10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 881 n.89 (1995) 
(implying that the misappropriation theory is not precluded by the text of the statute). 
 79. But see FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc‘ns, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 305 (2003) 
(criticizing the use of ―ever-available snippets of legislative history‖). 
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obligations.
80
 Reportedly, Congress never acted on such proposals—not 
because the bills would have imposed liability based on a breach of 
contract, but because of disagreement regarding the imposition of 
liability based on mere possession of inside information coincident to 
the troubling trade, as opposed to actual use of inside information in 
effecting a trade.
81
 Though the evidence does not incontrovertibly 
establish that Congress actually approves of a contractually imposed 
duty underlying a violation of § 10(b),
82
 the evidence hardly suggests 
that Congress precluded the Commission from promulgating such a 
rule. 
Confronted with a statute that prohibited deception but did not state 
whether silence could be deceptive,
83
 the Court reasonably determined 
that silence could not be deceptive absent a duty to disclose.
84
 The BLS 
conclude that the Court‘s interpretation eliminates any statutory 
ambiguity and precludes any interpretive role for the Commission.
85
 
The Commission, however, acted within its rights in promulgating Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1); the BLS ignore the Court‘s administrative law precedent, 
and interpret the Court‘s securities law precedent too narrowly.  
1.  Consideration of the Court‘s Administrative Law Precedent 
The BLS entitled the third section of their amicus brief filed with 
the Fifth Circuit as ―The SEC‘s justification for expanding liability 
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cannot overturn Supreme Court 
precedent.‖86 The premise that an agency overturns a court‘s decision is 
faulty, as the Court noted in Brand X:  
The dissent [argues] that allowing an agency to override 
what a court believes to be the best interpretation of a 
statute makes ―judicial decisions subject to reversal by 
executive officers.‖ It does not. Since Chevron teaches that 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See S. 1380, 100th Cong. §2 (1987) (―[I]nformation shall have been used or obtained 
wrongfully only if . . . by . . . misappropriation or a breach of any fiduciary, contractual, 
employment, personal, or other relationship of trust and confidence.‖) (emphasis added). 
 81. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 100. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2012). 
 82. For example, subsequent legislation carries more weight than does subsequent 
legislative history. Compare Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380–81 (1969) 
(―Subsequent legislation declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in 
statutory construction.‖), with Consumer Prod. Safety Comm‘n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
102, 118 n.13 (1980) (―A mere statement in a conference report of such legislation as to what 
the Committee believes an earlier statute meant is obviously less weighty.‖). 
 83. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (―[Section] 10(b) does not 
state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device.‖). 
 84. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (―Silence, absent a duty to 
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.‖). 
 85. BLS‘ Appellate Brief, supra note 13, at 23.  
 86. Id. at 22. 
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a court‘s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous 
statute an agency is charged with administering is not 
authoritative, the agency‘s decision to construe that statute 
differently from a court does not say that the court‘s 
holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency may, 
consistent with the court‘s holding, choose a different 
construction, since the agency remains the authoritative 
interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes. In 
all other respects, the court‘s prior ruling remains binding 
law (for example, as to agency interpretations to which 
Chevron is inapplicable). The precedent has not been 
―reversed‖ by the agency, any more than a federal court‘s 
interpretation of a State‘s law can be said to have been 
―reversed‖ by a state court that adopts a conflicting (yet 
authoritative) interpretation of state law.
87
 
Consequently, the Commission‘s adoption of a rule that interprets 
an ambiguous statute differently than had a court on a prior occasion 
does not amount to the agency‘s overturning a judicial decision. 
Deference to the agency is due, despite a court‘s interpretation of the 
ambiguity that precedes and differs from the agency‘s interpretation.88 
Thus, a court‘s holding that silence could not constitute a violation of 
§ 10(b) absent the breach of a fiduciary (or similar) duty does not 
preclude the Commission from promulgating a differing, but 
reasonable, rule resolving the statutory ambiguity. 
The logic undergirding the Court‘s analysis in Brand X applies to a 
situation involving a prior interpretation of statutory ambiguity by the 
Court that conflicts with an agency‘s subsequent reasonable 
interpretation. That is, earlier Court precedent that interprets statutory 
ambiguity and requires the breach of a fiduciary (or similar) duty for a 
violation of § 10(b) should not preclude the Commission from 
interpreting the ambiguity differently. Some, however, might 
distinguish Brand X, because the subsequent agency decision conflicted 
with a lower court‘s decision, not Supreme Court precedent.89 
Therefore, one should examine whether Supreme Court precedent 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84 
(2005) (citation omitted). 
 88. See id. at 982–83; Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank, LTD, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2889 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the Commission never acted to change court-created 
common law); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, LTD, 551 U.S. 308, 332 (2007) (Scalia, 
J. concurring in the judgment) (noting that discretion is ―conferred upon administrative 
agencies, which need not adopt what courts would consider the interpretation most faithful to 
the text of the statute, but may choose some other interpretation, so long as it is within the 
bounds of the reasonable‖). 
 89. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979.  
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precludes the Commission‘s interpretation as forged in Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1).  
2.  Consideration of the Court‘s Securities Law Precedent 
Despite Supreme Court precedent repeatedly describing the breach 
of a fiduciary (or similar) duty before silence can be deceptive under 
§ 10(b), the precedent does not preclude the Commission from 
promulgating Rule 10b5-2(b)(1). Because the Court repeatedly resolved 
cases involving fiduciaries, it repeatedly described a fiduciary duty as 
the source of the duty to disclose. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the 
culpable defendants were insiders of the corporation (who tipped 
outsiders),
90
 and thus, fiduciaries of the deceived selling shareholders. 
In O’Hagan, the culpable defendant was an attorney associated with the 
law firm representing the deceived party,
91
 and thus, a fiduciary. In 
Chiarella v. United States, the culpable defendant was an agent 
associated with the printer working on behalf of the deceived party,
92
 
and thus, a fiduciary.
93
 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the 
culpable defendants were broker–dealers,94 who, in certain 
circumstances, are subject to fiduciary duties.
95
 In Dirks v. SEC, the 
defendant was neither culpable nor a fiduciary, but the Court 
emphasized that he did not enter a confidentiality agreement with the 
source, nor did he misappropriate information.
96
 Despite the Court‘s 
repeated descriptions of the breach of fiduciary duty as the source of the 
                                                                                                                     
 90. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 227 n.2; Brief for Respondents, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988) (No. 86-279), 1987 WL 881063, at *24 n.9. 
 91. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647–48 (1997). 
 92. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
 93. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (―Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‗principal‘) manifests assent to another person (an 
‗agent‘) that the agent shall act on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s control, 
and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.‖); Macey, supra note 10, at 41 
(―The presence or absence of a fiduciary duty should be viewed as a consequence of a 
contractual relationship between the firm and another party.‖). 
 94. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151–52 (1972). 
 95. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER–DEALER REGULATION IN 
A NUTSHELL §53, at 154–55 (2003); Langevoort, supra note 75, at 442 (stating that courts, 
regulators, and broker–dealers themselves have been ―working hard to try to turn the brokerage 
industry into something better than the retail mattress or shoe business‖). But see Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 665 n.26 (1983). 
 96. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (noting that a duty to disclose arises from a fiduciary 
relationship); id. at 648 (noting that the defendant had no contractual or other relationship with 
the corporate source); id. at 665 (―[The defendant] took no action, directly or indirectly, that 
induced the shareholders or officers of Equity Funding to repose trust or confidence in him. 
There was no expectation by [his] sources that he would keep their information in confidence. 
Nor did [the defendant] misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity 
Funding.‖). 
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duty to disclose, ―such descriptions are just that—descriptive.‖97 
Section 10(b) says nothing about fiduciary duty, so requiring a breach 
thereof misses the mark.
98
 ―‗Fiduciary duties‘ are a questionable basis 
on which to distinguish insiders from others.‖99  
Nothing in Dirks, or any other Supreme Court precedent, precludes 
the requisite duty from being imposed by contract. To the contrary, 
when discussing the breach of a fiduciary duty, the Court has employed 
language applicable—without stretch or strain—to the breach of a 
confidentiality agreement. Regarding the obligations of corporate 
outsiders, the Court wrote: 
The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply 
that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate 
information, but rather that they have entered into a special 
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of 
the enterprise and are given access to information solely for 
corporate purposes. . . . For such a duty to be imposed, 
however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep 
the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the 
relationship at least must imply such a duty.
100
 
A corporate source agrees to disclose confidential information under a 
confidentiality agreement ―for corporate purposes,‖ not for altruistic 
reasons benefitting the confidant to the detriment of the source. What 
better way to set forth the corporation‘s ―expectations‖ regarding 
confidentiality than an express agreement? If the relationship ―at least 
must imply‖ a duty of confidentiality, then why could an agreement not 
expressly impose such a duty? Although the Court also referenced 
―special‖ relationships, perhaps suggesting that simple contractual 
relationships are not special, the Court dealt with implied obligations. 
So, while it may be inappropriate to imply the requisite duty in a simple 
contractual relationship, neither § 10(b) nor Court precedent precludes 
the breach of a contractually imposed duty as forming the basis for a 
§ 10(b) violation. 
                                                                                                                     
 97. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010). 
 98. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48–49 (2nd Cir. 2009); see also United States v. 
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2nd Cir. 1991) (―[SEC‘s] Rule 14e-3(a) . . . creates a duty in 
those traders who fall within its ambit to abstain or disclose, without regard to whether the 
trader owes a pre-existing fiduciary duty to respect the confidentiality of the information.‖). 
 99. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 269 (1991). 
 100. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) 
(embracing the position that the requisite duty underlying § 10(b) culpability could arise from 
―the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be available 
only for a corporate purpose‖). 
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Deception is what § 10(b) requires,
101
 and the breach of a fiduciary 
duty is simply one means of establishing deception; it is not the 
exclusive means of doing so.
102
 Counseling against the requirement of a 
fiduciary duty as the exclusive source of a duty to disclose is the Court‘s 
own caution against using ―rigid classifications‖ with respect to 
securities fraud.
103
 It merits mention that, in this setting, the Court refers 
to a fiduciary or similar duty, indicating that silence could be deceptive 
in nonfiduciary settings.
104
 Additionally, the Court cited the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts as authority for its position that a 
defendant‘s silence, while subject to a fiduciary duty, can constitute 
deception in a securities trade; but the Restatement also provides that 
silence can be deceptive in nonfiduciary settings.
105
 Because the Court 
has dealt with fiduciaries, it has not been required to address silence-as-
deception by nonfiduciaries, which hardly precludes the Commission 
from filling the statutory gap. One is ―feigning fidelity‖106 to the source 
when, after agreeing to safeguard information and without disclosure of 
the breach, one breaches either an implied fiduciary duty of confidence 
or a contractually imposed duty of confidence.
107
  
                                                                                                                     
 101. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977). 
 102. See id. at 474–75 (holding that an alleged fiduciary breach that is not coupled with an 
alleged omission or misstatement cannot constitute deception or manipulation); Dorozhko, 574 
F.3d at 49 (―[W]hat is sufficient is not always what is necessary . . . .‖); id. at 50 (―In its 
ordinary meaning, ‗deceptive‘ covers a wide spectrum of conduct involving . . . trading in 
falsehoods.‖); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d Cir. 1986) (―Although Dirks 
disapproved of certain trading by insiders or quasi-insiders who owe a fiduciary duty to 
investors, courts are not thereby constrained from recognizing other misconduct. To give Dirks 
such preclusive effect would suggest that one application of a statute cannot admit of another 
application not raised in the first case.‖); Karmel, supra note 15, at 97 (―There is a difference 
between interpreting a broad or ambiguous statute or rule by referring to the common law, and 
holding . . . that a statute and rule is limited by the common law. Congress passed broad, 
remedial securities legislation, like the Exchange Act, in order to make the public securities 
markets fair and equitable because of the inadequacies in the common law.‖). 
 103. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653 (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)); 
Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912. See generally United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 
(1997) (rejecting rigid classifications of defendants: ―it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer like 
O‘Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer, 
but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder.‖); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 249 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (rigid classification). 
 104. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (―[F]iduciary or other similar relation of trust and 
confidence . . . .‖). 
 105. See id. at 247–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Langevoort, supra note 78, at 872 n.30 
(―The Court‘s [Chiarella] opinion reads as if the Restatement (Second) of Torts supports its 
restriction of the duty to disclose to fiduciary relationships. In fact, as Justice Blackmun‘s 
dissent discusses, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (and the common law generally) support a 
broader duty to disclose.‖) (citations omitted). 
 106. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. 
 107. For example, when interpreting the mail fraud statute, the Court determined that 
misappropriation of information contrary to a confidentiality agreement constitutes deception. 
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C.  Reasonable Interpretation of Statutory Ambiguity 
Courts enforce reasonable agency-promulgated rules, not those that 
are arbitrary and capricious.
108
 The litigant who challenges the validity 
of an agency‘s rule bears the burden of establishing that the rule is 
arbitrary and capricious.
109
 Because portions of the forgoing analysis 
suggest that Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is reasonable, the following subsections 
highlight a few areas emphasized by the Court.  
1.  Consistency 
Courts accord deference to consistently applied, long-standing 
agency positions.
110
 The Commission‘s position regarding Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) has been consistent. No evidence has been located that the 
Commission previously claimed that the breach of a confidentiality 
agreement could not constitute deception under § 10(b). For decades, 
the Commission has advocated that the breach of a confidentiality 
agreement could constitute deception. Moreover, the Commission‘s 
long-standing position is consistent with long-standing common law.
111
   
In a 1961 administrative action, the Commission disciplined a 
corporate insider, who was subject to fiduciary duties, for insider 
                                                                                                                     
See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (―The concept of ‗fraud‘ includes the act 
of embezzlement, which is ‗the fraudulent appropriation to one‘s own use of the money or 
goods entrusted to one‘s care by another.‘‖) (citing Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902)); 
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28 (holding that conduct is fraudulent when, contrary to a duty of 
confidentiality, one appropriates confidential information ―all the while pretending to perform 
his duty of safeguarding it‖). 
 108. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 109. See City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (―The party 
challenging an agency‘s action as arbitrary and capricious bears the burden of proof.‖) (quoting 
Lomak Petroleum, Inc. v. FERC, 206 F.3d 1193, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). But see Stephen J. 
Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43 (2003) 
(arguing for a presumption against the Commission‘s regulatory intervention) (―[M]onopolistic 
regulators should face a stronger presumption against intervention than regulators facing 
competition.‖). 
 110. See Alaska Dep‘t. of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004); Barnhart 
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
(1944) (linking persuasiveness to agency interpretations that are long-standing and consistently 
applied). An agency position, however, need not be long-standing to benefit from Chevron 
deference; otherwise, ossification of the law could result. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 853–59, 865–66 (1984). 
 111. See Reply Brief of the SEC, Appellant, with Citations to Deferred Joint Appendix at 
14, SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1293) [hereinafter SEC Brief] (―This is 
merely in keeping with the long-standing common law doctrine that a person may assume a 
fiduciary duty by voluntarily accepting the confidence of another.‖) (collecting cases). See 
generally 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 19.2, at 104–05 (1978) (―In the 
oral trust situation, . . . the grantee usually was guilty of no wrong in accepting title to hold in 
trust for the grantor . . . . His wrong occurs after the transfer and consists of his breach of the 
confidence reposed in him.‖). 
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trading; however, in so doing, the Commission specifically stated that 
its position applied beyond corporate insiders.
112
 Relationships that 
could give rise to culpability include those ―giving access . . . to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and 
not for the personal benefit‖113 of the confidant. Though the 
Commission did not expressly reference confidentiality agreements, its 
stated position would apply to such agreements, and presaged a position 
that would more fully develop over time. In the 1980s, 1990s, and 
2000s, prior to the adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), the Commission 
articulated its position that the breach of a confidentiality agreement 
could constitute deception that violated § 10(b). 
In 1985, the Commission—as amicus in a criminal prosecution—
supported the position that ―[t]he origin of the confidence . . . [is] 
immaterial.‖114 In United States v. Reed, a son betrayed his father by 
trading on material, nonpublic information that the father disclosed to 
the son. Despite the absence of any reliance by the father on the son as a 
fiduciary, and despite the absence of an agreement between the two, the 
court accepted the Commission‘s position that the requisite deception 
could be inferred due to the pair‘s history of shared confidences.115 In 
Reed, the court recognized an obligation owed to the source of 
information that was not embodied in an express agreement, and 
accepted the Commission‘s position that the obligation that the 
defendant owed to the source could be based upon ―an agreement . . . of 
confidentiality, express or implied.‖116 The Commission has long 
advocated that the defendant may voluntarily subject himself to the 
requisite duty through a confidentiality agreement, in light of the 
uncertainty that attends a court‘s ex post, ad hoc implication of the 
requisite duty. The Court has referenced the value of certainty in the 
regulation of securities.
117
  
In a criminal prosecution from the 1990s, where the Commission 
and the Department of Justice jointly signed a brief, the Commission 
repeated its position that a confidentiality agreement could impose the 
requisite duty of confidentiality that, if breached, could result in a 
violation of § 10(b) for insider trading.
118
 The Commission‘s brief 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). 
 113. Id. 
 114. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 115. See id. at 709. No dominance or superiority is required when there is an express 
promise of fidelity. See id. (citing PALMER, supra note 111, §§ 19.2–.4, at 95–134). 
 116. Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 718; id. at 717 (―[E]ven in the absence of an express agreement, 
it properly may be determined that a confidential relationship existed . . . .‖). 
 117. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983) (―Unless the parties have some 
guidance as to where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses, 
neither corporate insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is crossed.‖). 
 118. Brief for the United States at 27, United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 
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phrased the issue as ―[whether the defendant was] bound by an 
agreement or understanding of confidentiality, express or 
implied, . . . that . . . generated . . . a justifiable expectation of 
confidentiality and fidelity.‖119 The en banc court accepted the 
Commission‘s position that breaching a confidentiality agreement could 
constitute deception and form the basis of an enforcement action under 
§ 10(b).
120
 
In a 1990 enforcement action, the Commission set forth its position 
that the requisite deception in a misappropriation case could be founded 
upon the breach of an agreement between occupants of neighboring 
businesses regarding the handling of mail.
121
 According to the 
Commission, Bruce Warren breached a duty of trust and confidence to 
his neighbor when he opened a letter addressed to the neighbor that was 
marked ―personal and confidential,‖ then provided a tip to an individual 
who traded on the basis of the material, nonpublic information 
contained therein.
122
 
In 2000, shortly before the adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), the 
Commission again advocated its position that a confidentiality 
agreement could impose the requisite duty to the source of material, 
nonpublic information.
123
 In the Commission‘s enforcement action 
against Michael Sargent, Dennis Shephard, and Robert Scharn, the 
source had informed a confidant that the information should not be 
disclosed to anyone else, and the confidant had assured the source that 
he would not disclose it.
124
 The court accepted the Commission‘s 
position that the defendant‘s culpability could rest upon ―a promise by 
the misappropriator that the information would be safeguarded.‖125  
The Commission‘s long-standing consistency in its position 
supports an inference of congressional acceptance of that position. 
When Congress repeatedly amends a statute, in the face of a long-
standing agency position, without upsetting the agency‘s position, such 
                                                                                                                     
1991) (No. 89-1276).  
 119. Id. (quoting Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 718). 
 120. See Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571 (―Keith‘s status as Susan‘s husband could not itself 
establish fiduciary status. Nor, absent a pre-existing fiduciary relation or an express agreement 
of confidentiality, could the coda—‗Don‘t tell.‘‖) (emphasis added). 
 121. See Litigation Release No. 12338, SEC v. Pencikowski, 45 SEC Docket 381 (Jan. 8, 
1990). 
 122. See id. at 381–82; 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, 
ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 6.04[2], at 6-21 n.22 (1991). 
 123. See SEC Brief, supra note 111, at 21. 
 124. See id.; SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) (―Aldrich told Shepard that 
this fact needed to be kept confidential and Shepard agreed not to disclose the information.‖). 
 125. Sargent, 229 F.3d at 75 (―[T]he existence of a fiduciary relationship turns on whether 
the source of the misappropriated information granted the misappropriator access to confidential 
information in reliance on a promise by the misappropriator that the information would be 
safeguarded.‖). 
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congressional inaction regarding the agency‘s position lends credence to 
that position, and favors judicial deference.
126
 Congress has amended 
the Exchange Act both since the Commission set forth its position 
informally,
127
 and since the Commission formally promulgated Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1).
128
 That rule commands judicial deference. 
2.  Consideration of Regulatory Alternatives 
Chevron deference also hinges on the importance of the issue being 
administratively enforced.
129
 The Commission relies heavily upon 
§ 10(b) (including Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder), leading some to 
refer to that tandem as the ―workhorse for securities fraud 
prevention.‖130 Enforcement by the Commission may be critical in 
misappropriation cases because viable alternatives are scarce. Although 
courts link Chevron deference to the thoroughness of the agency‘s 
deliberation, and an agency‘s thorough deliberation would include 
consideration of alternatives to its chosen regulatory rule, courts should 
be mindful of their limited role. Otherwise, courts run the risk, when 
examining regulatory alternatives, of undertaking inquiries like 
―whether the agency should regulate at all‖ and ―whether the agency 
should have chosen a different means of regulation,‖ which are not for 
the court,
131
 and which are beyond the scope of this Article.
132
  
Despite the court‘s limited role, some alternatives to Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) are addressed here. For example, criminal prosecution presents 
one alternative, but many prefer civil public enforcement to criminal 
public enforcement.
133
 Even if Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) provides some 
                                                                                                                     
 126. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 
220 (2002). 
 127. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 
Stat. 1264 (1984) (authorizing the Commission to seek three times the gain or loss avoided). 
 128. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 763, 124 Stat. 1376, 1762 (2010); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 1106, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (2002). 
 129. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222; Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1169 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that an agency has a ―duty to consider responsible alternatives‖). 
 130. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 641 (2010); see also David M. Brodsky & Daniel J. Kramer, A Critique 
of the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 41, 45 (1998) 
(―[S]ection 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 have become the primary provisions for prosecuting insider 
trading.‖). 
 131. See Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs, 545 U.S. 967, 982–
83 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984). 
 132. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 133. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 J. BUS. & 
TECH. L. 59 (2007) (discussing the negative ramifications of subjecting corporate agents to 
criminal penalties); Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 
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certainty, the general uncertainty that attends the regulation of insider 
trading may counsel against criminal prosecution.
134
 
Some prefer the states to the federal government when it comes to 
regulating securities,
135
 but Congress has acted contrary to such 
preferences by creating a federal regulatory regime,
136
 by preempting 
state regulation in certain areas,
137
 and going so far as to use the federal 
regulation of securities to encroach on matters of corporate law, which 
traditionally has been an area of state regulation.
138
 Congress 
emphasized the applicability of federal law to insider trading and 
enhanced the Commission‘s authority regarding insider trading.139 
Moreover, Congress has suggested that its regulations apply to the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading.
140
 
                                                                                                                     
369–71 (2008) (same). 
 134. See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1622 (noting the incoherence of insider-trading law 
and attributing that incoherence, in part, to its development over time through individual 
enforcement actions). See generally Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (―[I]t is 
appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute‘s 
coverage.‖). 
 135. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION 48–49 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 125 (1998) (―State law already offers better-developed legal rules 
regarding property rights.‖). 
 136. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (creating the Commission); id. § 78aa (creating 
exclusive federal jurisdiction for matters arising under the Exchange Act). 
 137. See id. § 77r(a). But see id. §§ 78bb(a), (f). 
 138. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 1523 (2005); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack 
Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783–84 (2011). In limited 
areas, Congress has precluded enforcement by state entities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2006). The 
argument that an unsupervised federal agency has wrongfully infringed on the states‘ domain 
loses force when the agency‘s position is long-standing. The Commission‘s position set forth in 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) is long-standing. See supra Subsection II.C.1. 
 139. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 
Stat. 1264 (1984) (authorizing the Commission to seek three times the gain or loss avoided). 
 140. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6047 
(―Under current case law, the SEC must establish that the person misusing the information has 
breached either a fiduciary duty to shareholders or some other duty not to misappropriate insider 
information.‖); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 
6063 (―[T]he codification of a right of action for contemporaneous traders is specifically 
intended to overturn court cases which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where the 
defendant‘s violation is premised upon the misappropriation theory.‖); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 
4–5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2277–78 (―[C]onversion for personal gain of 
information lawfully obtained abuses relationships of trust and confidence and is no less 
reprehensible than the outright theft of nonpublic information. In other areas of the law, 
deceitful misappropriation of confidential information by a fiduciary . . . has consistently been 
held to be [criminal]. The Congress has not sanctioned a less rigorous code of conduct [for civil 
matters] under the federal securities laws.‖) (citation omitted). 
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We commonly turn to public enforcement when private enforcement 
is lacking.
141
 So, does private enforcement suffer from any 
shortcomings? Private enforcement of misappropriation cases under 
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act will frequently fail. The deceived source 
often will not have purchased or sold securities, and would therefore 
lack standing under § 10(b).
142
 Private misappropriation actions by 
third-party traders under § 10(b) may also be doomed for failure to 
establish reliance and causation.
143
 Private enforcement by a class under 
state law may be precluded,
144
 and individual actions may be cost-
prohibitive.
145
  
Instead of securities-based litigation, what about a simple contract 
claim for breaching the confidentiality agreement?
146
 Proving a breach 
may be problematic; even if done, remedies may be lacking. The source 
of information faces tremendous difficulty in identifying how the 
confidential information entered the market or who is responsible for 
the leak. The one entrusted with information may have disguised her 
trades or surreptitiously tipped others about the information.
147
 Such 
difficulties of detection lessen private enforcement, and counsel in favor 
of public enforcement, as the federal government possesses greater 
detection tools.
148
 Multiple private parties—such as the source and a 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Barack Obama, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-union-addre 
ss (―[G]overnment should do for people only what they cannot do better by themselves, and no 
more.‖) (crediting Abraham Lincoln). 
 142. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738–39 (1975). 
 143. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–53 
(2006) (requiring private plaintiffs to establish reliance); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005) (requiring private plaintiff to establish loss causation). 
 144. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
§ 101(b), 112 Stat. 3227, 3230 (1998); Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87–88 (2006). 
 145. See COX, supra note 3, at 747 (―[Because] most purchasers or sellers have relatively 
small amounts at stake . . . , the class action device is often the only economically viable means 
of achieving the compensatory and deterrent goals underlying the private action.‖). 
 146. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 263 (―That no uniform rule is optimal 
implies that the subject is best left to negotiations between insiders (and others) and the firm. 
Courts would enforce actual contracts . . . .‖). 
 147. See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 68 (1991) (―Using codes was fun; it gave 
their insider-trading scheme the aura of a Hardy Boys escapade. Soon they were engaged in 
conversations so riddled with codes they would have seemed ludicrous to any listener.‖); Kara 
Scannell, SEC Loss Shows Difficulty of Insider Cases, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2010, at C1 
(showing that insider trading is notoriously difficult to detect when intelligent individuals 
attempt to shield their actions). 
 148. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 263 (―[T]he difficulty of enforcing 
such contracts makes it impossible for firms to achieve optimal allocations of the rights. 
Insiders‘ trades are notoriously hard to detect . . . . If firms seeking to curtail inside trading by 
contract cannot enforce their choices, then the benefits are lost. . . . If the probability of 
detecting improper trades is low, public enforcement may be best.‖); Macey, supra note 10,  at 
46 n.185 (―[T]he cost to the firm of insuring that managers do not abuse their right to trade may 
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self-regulatory organization, such as a stock exchange—may monitor 
the same subject. Duplicative private enforcement may contribute to 
underenforcement,
149
 as each monitor allocates fewer resources to 
monitoring the confidant on the mistaken belief that another monitor 
will continue its vigilance. A single public enforcer may be superior.
150
  
Remedies for breach may be inadequate. The potential for profit 
may incentivize contract breaches, which, if detected, may be 
underdeterred by a simple damages claim.
151
 The risk of reputational 
harm may prevent some parties from breaching a confidentiality 
agreement, but reputational harm provides far less discipline for 
nonrepeat players. Although the public eventually would have learned 
of Cuban‘s trades, the public might not have learned of the 
confidentiality agreement (which was an oral agreement
152
) or its 
breach. For some, such as Cuban, reputational harm may not jeopardize 
future opportunities to a degree that adequately disciplines them for 
their breaches. Mark Cuban has billions of dollars to invest, and he 
earned his money through his technological savvy. Because of his 
money and experience, Cuban probably would be presented with 
opportunities, even if he were known to have breached a confidentiality 
agreement. Recognizing that private remedies may be inadequate, 
Congress bolstered the remedies that the government may seek.
153
  
It is no secret that post-disclosure private remedies are inadequate 
for the breach of a confidentiality agreement. A confidentiality 
agreement itself reflects the shortcomings of post-disclosure remedies. 
Confidentiality agreements typically provide for specific performance 
because of the difficulty of determining damages. Moreover, 
confidentiality agreements also require that the confidant provide notice 
to the source prior to any potential compelled disclosure. The notice 
provision allows for the possibility of the source obtaining a protective 
                                                                                                                     
raise the cost of transacting, thereby making it more efficient for the firm to ban such trading.‖). 
 149. Cf. Macey, supra note 10, at 59 (noting that reliance on private enforcement ―may 
result in a suboptimal level of enforcement‖). 
 150. Compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 263, with Henry G. Manne, 
Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 565 (1970) (―I do not believe 
[the SEC‘s] enforcement techniques are nearly as good as they say . . . .‖). 
 151. See Macey, supra note 10, at 59. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 
99, at 260. Moreover, the expected gain may exceed the expected loss, due to the low likelihood 
of detection. By allegedly trading on inside information, Martha Stewart risked millions and 
incarceration to avoid the loss of a relatively nominal sum. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart 
Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1044 (Del. 2004) (referencing plaintiff‘s 
claim that Stewart‘s illegal trades jeopardized the company‘s financial future); Litigation 
Release No. 18169, SEC v. Stewart, 80 SEC Docket 1244 (June 4, 2003) (discussing allegations 
against Stewart, whose trades avoided the loss of less than $50,000). 
 152. See Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
 153. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264 
(1984) (authorizing the Commission to seek three times the gain or loss avoided). 
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order. Post-disclosure remedies may prove inadequate to discipline the 
breaching party. 
A final alternative might be no regulation at all, as the market may 
discipline insider trading. First, in support of this alternative, long-term 
considerations might deter any potential improper short-term focus by 
insiders.
154
 Second, a rule that allows insiders to trade might permit the 
source to compensate the insider more efficiently, by, for example, 
lowering annual salary in light of the insider‘s ability to trade profitably 
on material nonpublic information.
155
 Counterarguments exist. Even if 
the threat of long-term costs commonly deters an individual from 
engaging in short-term misconduct, some individuals sacrifice long-
term benefits for short-term gain.
156
 A general truth need not prevent the 
promulgation of a rule designed to address uncommon behavior. (And, 
of course, such uncommon behavior may be far more common than 
realized.) Aware of the consequences of such long-term for short-term 
trade-offs, the government may regulate private parties‘ compensation 
schemes. One recent example follows. In the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002, Congress prohibited businesses from compensating their 
accountants in certain ways because of externalities.
157
 Accountants at 
Arthur Andersen LLP helped fell the firm because their compensation 
scheme led them to compare their personal benefits and costs, ignoring 
third-party costs, even though those costs were leviathan.
158
 The impact 
of the accountants‘ misdeeds reached well beyond themselves, 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See MANNE, supra note 16, at 148–51. 
 155. See id. at 138. 
 156. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5–6 (2005); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued 
Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 14–15 (2005); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1604. 
 157. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 201–03, 206, 116 Stat. 745, 
773–775 (2002); id. § 402(a), 787 (prohibiting executives to be compensated through loans). In 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress responded to 
criticisms of the excesses of executive compensation by empowering shareholders of certain 
corporations to have a ―say on pay.‖ See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). See generally LUCIAN 
A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (describing the excesses of executive compensation and 
discussing managerial influence over executive compensation). 
 158. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1239 (2002) 
(―The previous paragraphs addressed the independence of Andersen as a firm, but of course 
services were delivered by specific agents of the firm, its Houston partners. It now seems that 
the compensation of the Houston partners was significantly tied to their client billings both for 
auditing services and for consulting services. Enron might have been a relatively small client for 
Andersen, the firm, but it was the largest client for its Houston office, and, for the Enron 
relationship partners, perhaps their only significant client. . . . The disparity between the value of 
the Houston partners‘ share of Andersen‘s reputation and the value to them of a continued (or 
more lucrative) Enron client relationship sets up an obvious moral hazard problem.‖). 
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impacting the credibility of the entire firm, and placing in question the 
imprimatur of other accounting firms.
159
 Allowing insider trading could 
incentivize valuable innovation, but such a rule need not yield an 
efficient compensation scheme, as insiders could profit on the 
innovations of others.
160
 This scenario was precisely the case in 
O’Hagan, where the Court embraced the misappropriation theory. 
O‘Hagan exhibited no entrepreneurial skill in creating the valuable, 
nonpublic information on which he traded.
161
  
Though some reasonably prefer alternatives to federal regulation of 
the misappropriation theory, those alternatives face reasonable 
criticisms. The Commission can choose among reasonable regulatory 
alternatives. 
3.  Internal Inconsistency 
Courts have struck down agency-promulgated rules as arbitrary and 
capricious when those rules are internally inconsistent.
162
 Perhaps Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1) should fall, as the rationale underlying the 
misappropriation theory is internally inconsistent. The misappropriation 
theory serves, in part, to protect market integrity, but the theory allows 
that protection to be circumvented as next described. To protect the 
integrity of the secondary markets, we will not allow a misappropriating 
confidant to trade on misappropriated information, because other traders 
in the market could not, by the sweat of their brow, have obtained the 
same information.
163
 The misappropriation theory, however, permits the 
confidant to trade on that information if he admits to the source his 
intention to trade, because the source would, in that instance, not be 
deceived.
164
 Even if the source is not deceived, other traders in the 
market will continue to be unaware of the material, nonpublic 
information, and those other traders still could not have gathered the 
information by expending their best efforts. The misappropriation 
theory, designed to enhance market integrity, can operate to undermine 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See id.; A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 19, 26 (2006). 
 160. See MANNE, supra note 16, at 156–58. 
 161. See United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997); MANNE, supra note 16, at 
131–45 (discussing the entrepreneur‘s compensation). 
 162. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989). 
 163. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53, 658–59; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51727 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)) (―We have 
long recognized that the fundamental unfairness of insider trading harms not only individual 
investors but also the very foundations of our markets, by undermining investor confidence in 
the integrity of the markets.‖); id. at 51729 (―[T]he trader‘s informational advantage stems from 
contrivance, not luck, and the informational disadvantage to other investors cannot be overcome 
with research or skill.‖) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 164. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655. 
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it.
165
 Such internal inconsistency could undermine the validity of Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1).  
Another internal inconsistency of the misappropriation theory is its 
foundation in property law. The theory is supported by the source‘s 
property rights in the information misappropriated by the confidant.
166
 
The misappropriation theory prohibits the confidant from exploiting the 
property of the source to the source‘s detriment. If the source truly has a 
property right in that information, then the source should be free not to 
protect that right; that is, the source should be free to opt out of the 
Commission‘s regulation of its property. This, however, the source 
cannot do.
167
  
While these are sound arguments, they may not persuade the reader. 
The alternative to agency resolution of such disputes is resolution by the 
courts. In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation 
theory; it was not persuaded that the theory was doomed by the 
aforementioned internal inconsistencies. Given the Court‘s adoption of 
the theory, the Commission need not abandon it.
168
 Congress has 
suggested its support for the misappropriation theory,
169
 indicating 
again that the Commission need not abandon it. Additionally, Congress 
has charged the Commission with balancing potentially competing 
interests.
170
 At some level, the charge to protect investors may conflict 
with the charge to protect businesses‘ ability to raise capital. Given 
Congress‘ (potentially) internally inconsistent mandate, the 
Commission‘s rules may be internally inconsistent at some level, which 
should not doom deference.
171
  
                                                                                                                     
 165. See id. at 689–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 166. See id. at 653–54; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 254 (―Better, then, to 
identify property rights in information.‖); Bainbridge, supra note 37, at 1644–50; Macey, supra 
note 10, at 18 n.47 (―Liability for 10b-5 violations is now founded on a theory . . . that finds its 
own roots in a ‗business property theory‘ of insider trading liability.‖); see also Manne, supra 
note 150, at 549–51 (criticizing the property rights theory). 
 167. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006) (―Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any 
person . . . to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and 
regulations of the Commission shall be void.‖). 
 168. Cf. Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887–88 (2010) (―Since the 
Commission‘s interpretations relied on cases we disapprove, . . . we owe them no deference.‖). 
 169. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. See generally STOCK Act, S. 1903, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (prohibiting members of Congress and their staff from trading in securities based 
upon material nonpublic information learned through the course of their jobs); STOCK Act, S. 
1871, 112th Cong. (2011) (same); STOCK Act, H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011) (same). The 
Stock Act has since been enacted. See STOCK Act, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4, 126 Stat. 291, 292 
(2012). 
 170. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006) (―Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is 
engaged in rulemaking . . . the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote . . . capital formation.‖). 
 171. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 181 (1973) (deferring to the 
agency when required to ―strik[e] a balance between . . . conflicting legitimate interests‖ 
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Other attacks, not limited to the misappropriation theory, have been 
launched against the coherence of the theory prohibiting insider 
trading.
172
 For example, federal securities laws generally, and the 
Commission‘s rules in particular, are designed to enhance efficiency.173 
A general attack on the prohibition of insider trading has been that 
information does not enter the market through insiders‘ trades, so that 
the share price does not accurately reflect material, nonpublic 
information; this distorts the cost of capital, and results in the inefficient 
allocation of resources.
174
 This broad conception of efficiency suggests 
that insider trading should be permitted, so that material, nonpublic 
information enters the market more quickly.
175
 Although this broad 
conception of efficiency (taking into account the interests of third 
parties
176
) counsels in favor of permitting insider trading, a narrow 
conception of efficiency counsels against insider trading (taking into 
account the interests of the parties to a confidentiality agreement). 
Contracts evidence the parties‘ values. A confidentiality agreement that 
prohibits the confidant‘s use of information for trading may be the best 
evidence of the efficient allocation of the source‘s information.177 Rule 
10b5-2(b)(1) embraces the efficient allocation by the parties to the 
confidentiality agreement (possibly at the expense of the market‘s 
overall efficient allocation of resources), and in furtherance of the 
Commission‘s market-integrity argument.178 Even those who disfavor 
                                                                                                                     
because that balance is ―often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress 
committed primarily‖ to the agency) (internal quotation marks omitted); EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 283 (―[A] rule against fraud is not . . . essential . . . [but] certification 
methods [are] costly . . . . A rule against fraud can reduce these costs . . . .‖). 
 172. See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1622 (attributing the incoherence of insider-trading 
law, in part, to its development over time through individual enforcement actions). See generally 
id. at 1610 (noting the internally inconsistent premises of securities regulation that (1) the 
typical investors are unsophisticated, and (2) those same investors will comprehend any 
mandated disclosure). 
 173. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2006) (―Whenever pursuant to this chapter the Commission is 
engaged in rulemaking . . . the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency . . . .‖). 
 174. Compare Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. 
FIN. 1661, 1661 & n.1 (1992), with Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 631 (noting that an 
insider‘s trade has communicative value, but is not an efficient means of communication). But 
see Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 75, 
78 (2002) (―[T]he cost of equity . . . decreases significantly after the first prosecution [under 
insider trading laws].‖). 
 175. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 257; Manne, supra note 150, at 565–
66. 
 176. See Manne, supra note 150, at 566 (―The gains from efficiency are diffuse and often 
specifically unidentifiable.‖). 
 177. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 259; Macey, supra note 10, at 46 n.185 
(―[I]t may be . . . more efficient for the firm to ban such trading.‖). 
 178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2012) (including agreements to maintain information in 
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the Commission‘s prohibition of insider trading acknowledge the 
benefit of the parties‘ private, efficient allocation regarding the 
information: ―[W]hy . . . assume that anyone advocating no government 
rule against insider trading is necessarily saying that it may not be 
banned in a private contract?‖179 ―[I]f . . . a corporation properly 
indicates that its rule is no insider trading, that should be the business of 
that corporation and its shareholders and the courts if a violation is 
alleged.‖180 
4.  Relative Institutional Expertise 
Besides the standard arguments that favor judicial deference to an 
agency—such as a national rule that is uniform across all court 
jurisdictions
181
 and the avoidance of regulatory ossification traceable to 
the stare decisis principle employed by courts
182—courts defer to 
agencies due to their relative expertise.
183
 Whereas courts generally 
resolve legal dilemmas lacking in precision—for example, reasonable 
search or totality of the circumstances—an agency may bring science to 
bear on certain dilemmas and offer precision ordinarily lacking in legal 
disputes, justifying judicial deference to the agency. We might prefer 
that, before a court defers to an agency, the agency undertake rigorous 
empirical analysis of the expected benefits of contemplated regulation 
in light of expected costs of that regulation.
184
 Some contend that the 
                                                                                                                     
confidence within the enumerated ―duties of trust and confidence‖). 
 179. Manne, supra note 150, at 580. 
 180. Id. at 581. 
 181. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 847–48 
(1984). 
 182. See SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (―[G]rowing 
recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed 
around transactions involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of 
such intangibles as advice and securities, and that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to 
the merchandise in issue.‖). 
 183. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66; Langevoort, supra note 78, at 868 (―[T]he Supreme 
Court speaks with very little expertise, and hence relatively less subject-matter authority, on 
intricate matters of federal regulation such as securities law.‖); see also SEC v. Zandford, 535 
U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002) (―[The SEC‘s] interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b), in the 
context of formal adjudication, is entitled to deference if it is reasonable, see United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30, and n. 12 (2001).‖); United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 
642, 673 (―[Section] 14(e)‘s rulemaking authorization gives the Commission ‗latitude,‘ even in 
the context of a term of art . . . . [W]e must accord the Commission‘s assessment ‗controlling 
weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.‘‖). 
 184. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (―[T]he 
Commission relied upon insufficient empirical data . . . .‖); Manne, supra note 150, at 548 (―The 
debatable aspects of insider trading are capable of resolution through tools of economic 
analysis.‖); id. at 568 (―We must either utilize hard, accurate data or we should proceed on the 
assumptions dictated by the most logical economic doctrines.‖); Henry G. Manne, Insider 
Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 473, 510 (1967) [hereinafter 
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Commission‘s regulation of insider trading is not reasonable, and is 
perhaps arbitrary and capricious, because empirical analyses do not 
support—or worse, undermine—the rationales offered by the 
Commission.
185
 Some contend that the Commission frequently accords 
little weight to such empirical evidence,
186
 and instead runs to fuzzy 
notions of fairness, investor protection, and market integrity to justify 
its regulatory efforts.
187
  
Despite the strength of these arguments, the Commission‘s rule is 
reasonable. First, although the Commission may rely on fuzzy notions, 
those same fuzzy notions motivated Congress to increase the 
Commission‘s powers to deter insider trading.188 Additionally, those 
same fuzzy notions have motivated decisions by the Court.
189
 Second, 
                                                                                                                     
Manne, Administrative Process] (―[I]n an area like insider trading . . . [,] empirical data and 
rigorous economic analysis would be . . . desirable.‖). 
  On a related note, systematic evidence is preferred to anecdotal evidence. Anecdotes, 
however, frequently prompt legislation by Congress. For example, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act was 
prompted by the accounting scandals at WorldCom and Enron. See Rich Karlgaard, America’s 
12-Step Program, FORBES, Jan. 17, 2011, at 24. Anecdotes need not be ignored by the 
Commission, and a single anecdote may justify a regulation, depending on its magnitude and the 
likelihood of its recurrence. 
 185. See Meulbroek, supra note 174, at 1661, 1696. 
 186. See generally Choi & Pritchard, supra note 109, at 30 (―Evidence that does not 
discredit regulation unambiguously will be ignored. And the . . . bias will be more pronounced if 
the evidence is more complex and subject to conflicting inferences, a fair characterization of 
most regulatory problems in the securities markets.‖) (citations omitted). 
 187. See id. at 33 (―The SEC often uncritically states that it seeks to protect investors—and 
in particular, that absent the SEC‘s efforts, investor confidence in the market will deteriorate. 
Rarely, however, does the SEC verify that its assumptions are correct. The SEC instead simply 
asserts that investor confidence demands its latest regulatory intervention.‖); Manne, Insider 
Trading and the Administrative Process, supra note 184, at 506 (―[A] simple allegation of 
unfairness [should not] be allowed as a substitute for research and analysis . . . [and] does not 
meet the standards which are required for the exercise of administrative expertise.‖). 
 188. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264 
(1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 (―Capital 
formation and our nation‘s economic growth and stability depend on investor confidence in the 
fairness and integrity of our capital markets. Insider trading threatens these markets by 
undermining the public‘s expectations of honest and fair markets . . . .‖). Moreover, note that, 
while Dean Henry Manne credits psychological and social factors that are consistent with his 
theory, see MANNE, supra note 16, at 150 (stating that psychological factors will lead insiders to 
produce favorable information, not to produce intentionally unfavorable information), he 
discredits psychological and social factors that are inconsistent with his theory. Compare 
Manne, Administrative Process, supra note 184, at 506 (criticizing the Commission and 
commentators when either references fairness), with MANNE, supra note 16, at 15 
(acknowledging that moral standards play an important role in the business community and in 
the effective functioning of markets). 
 189. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006) (―The magnitude of the federal 
interest in protecting the integrity . . . of the market for nationally traded securities cannot be 
overstated.‖). 
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the onus is not on the agency to support its regulation with empirical 
analysis.
190
 The party challenging the regulation bears that burden.   
Critics of the Commission commonly offer logical arguments 
lacking in empirical support.
191
 For example, critics of the Commission 
note that investors seemed to exhibit confidence in the U.S. securities 
markets for decades prior to the Commission‘s concerted efforts to 
stamp out insider trading in the 1980s.
192
 The presence of investor 
confidence, however, does not address the underlying issue: What is the 
appropriate baseline for enforcement? What if pre-1980s investors 
exhibited confidence in the U.S. markets due to an absence of viable 
alternatives? What if non-U.S. markets during those decades were 
riddled with fraud, relative to U.S. markets?
193
 Though investors may 
have exhibited confidence in the U.S. markets prior to the 
Commission‘s rigorous enforcement against insider trading, rigorous 
enforcement may enhance investor confidence such that the benefits of 
enforcement exceed the costs of enforcement.  
Allowing Mr. O‘Hagan or Mr. Cuban to trade may enhance the 
efficiency of the markets, which is valuable—but how valuable?194 On 
the other side of the ledger, allowing insiders to trade creates moral 
hazards for insiders,
195
 which imposes costs. What is the magnitude of 
those costs?
196
 Reliable measures of the benefits and costs may not be 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (―[W]e are 
acutely aware that an agency need not—indeed cannot—base its every action upon empirical 
data; depending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be ‗entitled to conduct . . . a 
general analysis based on informed conjecture.‘ . . . The Commission‘s decision not to do an 
empirical study does not make that an unreasoned decision.‖). 
 191. See Manne, supra note 150, at 570 (shifting the burden to the government to quantify 
the benefits of its regulation). 
 192. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 109, at 35; Manne, supra note 150, at 577 (―[T]he 
public has never shown any signs of losing confidence in the stock market because of the 
existence of insider trading.‖); see also id. at 564 (noting the ―scarcity‖ of SEC enforcement 
actions for insider trading during the 1960s); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1620 (discussing the 
Commission‘s high-profile enforcement campaign against insider trading during the 1980s). 
 193. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary 
Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 144 (2005) (―[C]ountries with more 
prohibitive insider trading laws have . . . more accurate stock prices, and more liquid stock 
markets. These findings are generally robust to controlling for measures of disclosure and 
enforceability and suggest that formal insider trading laws (especially their deterrence 
components) matter to stock market development.‖). 
 194. See Manne, supra note 150, at 566 (―The gains from efficiency are . . . often 
specifically unidentifiable.‖). 
 195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2006) (prohibiting directors, officers, and large shareholders 
from shorting equity securities of specified issuers); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 99, at 
260; Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Q&A: Is Insider Trading Beneficial?, 
FAMA/FRENCH FORUM (April 28, 2010), http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2010/04/qa-
is-insider-trading-beneficial.html. 
 196. See Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006) (―The magnitude of the federal 
interest in protecting the integrity . . . of the market for nationally traded securities cannot be 
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easily obtained.
197
 Even if obtained, ―empirical evidence . . . can 
quickly go stale.‖198 
Many economists disagree with the Commission‘s regulation of 
insider trading,
199
 but other widely respected economists believe that 
insider trading should be prohibited.
200
 Given disagreement among 
economists, why must the Commission accept the position of some 
economists (allow insider trading) rather than other economists 
(prohibit insider trading), particularly when Congress and the public 
favor the latter group?
201
 The values emphasized by certain economists 
may not be the values emphasized by members of Congress, the 
Commission, or the public.  
Congress entrusted the Commission to exercise its discretion in 
balancing competing evidence and viewpoints.
202
 Sometimes scientific 
precision drives an agency‘s regulation, but sometimes an agency 
simply makes policy.
203
 In § 10(b), Congress authorized the 
Commission—not the courts—to make policy. That an agency makes 
policy based upon political considerations should not strip the agency‘s 
discretion of deference by the courts.
204
 Congress delegated the policy 
                                                                                                                     
overstated.‖). 
 197. See MANNE, supra note 16, at 59, 70–71 (noting the lack of reliable data); Beny, supra 
note 193, at 145 (expressing a preference for empiricism but noting that the insider-trading 
debate has largely been theoretical); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1623 (―[C]lean tests are often 
hard to come by.‖). 
 198. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1606. 
 199. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 895 (1983); Meulbroek, supra note 174, at 1661–63. See generally 
Manne, supra note 150, at 547 (expressing gratification at the reception of his work by 
economists). 
 200. See Fama & French, supra note 195; see also Beny, supra note 193, at 144; 
Bhattacharya, supra note 174, at 76–78. 
 201. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264 
(1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 (―This 
legislation provides increased sanctions against insider trading in order to increase deterrence of 
violations.‖); Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1620 (―The routine of insider trading 
enforcement . . . cases . . . probably reflects the perception that these are the SEC‘s most reliable 
public relations tools.‖). 
 202. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (―When specialists 
express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of 
its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more 
persuasive.‖). 
 203. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 1215, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (―When . . . an 
agency is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties exist or where facts 
alone do not provide the answer, our role is more limited; we require only that the agency so 
state and go on to identify the considerations it found persuasive.‖); Emily Hammond Meazell, 
Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 
109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 751–52 (2011) (discussing the science charade). 
 204. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2, 66–68 (2009). 
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making function to the Commission, and courts should defer to the 
Commission‘s reasonable exercise of its discretion.205 ―[I]t is interesting 
how frequently economists find ex post that, notwithstanding the 
guesswork, the [Commission‘s] lawmaking predictions turn out 
reasonably well.‖206 
The insightful criticisms of the ban on insider trading are not new,
207
 
but Congress has repeatedly enacted statutes that implicitly reject such 
criticisms.
208
 The Commission has repeatedly rejected those criticisms 
through adjudication and rulemaking. When promulgating Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1), the Commission indicated that the benefits of the rule included 
eliminating some of the uncertainty attendant to the regulation of insider 
trading,
209
 and that it attributed no appreciable costs to the rule, and no 
commentator suggested otherwise.
210 
Courts should defer to the 
Commission‘s considered judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators who have examined the validity of Rule 10b5-
2(b)(1) have considered the Court‘s securities law jurisprudence, but in 
the process, they have paid little or no attention to the Court‘s 
developing administrative law jurisprudence. By not considering the 
role of administrative law, those commentators have approached the 
Commission‘s rule with undue skepticism. Deference to the 
Commission, however, is due. 
                                                                                                                     
 205. Manne, Administrative Process, supra note 184, at 510 (―[Insider trading] is not an 
area where we can condone the courts making policy because they are comparatively as well 
qualified as the agency.‖). 
 206. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1626. 
 207. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 16; Manne, supra note 150, at 548 (noting warmer 
reception of his 1966 book by economists than by lawyers). 
 208. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264 
(1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2275 (―This 
legislation provides increased sanctions against insider trading in order to increase deterrence of 
violations.‖). 
 209. The Court has emphasized the need for certainty in the regulation of securities fraud. 
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983) (―Unless the parties have some guidance as to 
where the line is between permissible and impermissible disclosures and uses, neither corporate 
insiders nor analysts can be sure when the line is crossed.‖). 
 210. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51729 (Aug. 24, 
2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2012)). 
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